The two main hurdles to a widespread carbon capture and storage (CCS) deployment are its cost and social acceptance issues. Assessing accurately social preferences is thus interesting to determine whether CCS techniques use is socially optimal. Unlike most academic papers that have a dichotomous approach and consider either the atmospheric pollution (first source of marginal disutility) or the underground pollution (second source), the problem is considered as a whole: CCS introduces a third source of disutility due to the simultaneous presence of CO 2 in the atmosphere and in geological formations. We show that there are some configurations of social preferences for which CCS use grants a higher social welfare provided that public authorities tax the carbon content of fossil fuels and subsidise carbon storage. CCS can even increase simultaneously the social welfare of the country with CCS and the one of the country without. Tied with the idea of minimising the decarbonizing costs and with the large literature on burden sharing in greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, two cases are compared to assess the transfers required to encourage CCS deployment: the case where each country defines its own climate policy and when they are aggregated.
Introduction
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [14, 15] , in order to limit the long-term global temperature increase to 2 • C (COP 15), it is necessary to halve the current level of CO 2 equivalent emissions by 2050. However, if current trends persist, CO 2 emissions will almost double by 2050 due to an 85 % increase in global energy demand, potentially leading to a 6 • C rise in average global temperature (International Energy Agency (IEA), [21] ). Thus, the current concentration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere combined with the momentum of climate trends requires swift action and the investigation of any technical options that could contribute to reaching the 2 • C goal, such as the following: (1) large-scale investment in the development of clean energies, i.e. renewable energy sources (RES) and nuclear, (2) improvements in energy efficiency, (3) fuel switching (coal to gas), and (4) carbon capture and storage techniques (CCS) (Grimston et al. [12] ). CCS is a suite of geo-engineering techniques designed to intercept the CO 2 contained in industrial flue gases from large point sources (e.g., fossil fuel plants, blast furnaces and cement manufacturing) before it enters the atmosphere, transport it (by trucks, ships or pipelines) and then inject it into a suitable storage facility (e.g., depleted oil and gas fields and deep saline aquifers). International organisations such as the IEA [22] , IPCC [15] and the European Commission [5] have noted that CCS is the only current mitigation technology that would allow industrial sectors (such as iron, steel and cement as well as fossil fuel power plants) to meet deep emission reduction targets. For instance, the IEA [22] develops a 2DS scenario in which CCS could account for up to 14 % of cumulative CO 2 reductions by 2050 (17 % in 2050) . Over the last years, a multitude of integrated assessment models (IAM) have been developed to characterise future GHG emissions and to analyse the cost of policies for reducing such emissions. These models have become an important tool in the political decision-making process (Edenhofer et al. [9] ). Amongst these IAMs, some focus more specifically on low-carbon technologies like CCS and nuclear. Without being exhaustive, one can quote McFarland et al. [19] , Edmonds et al. [10] , Kurosawa [16] and Luderer et al. [18] . Like stylized models (e.g. Moslerner and Requate [20] ), they generally give the determinants of an optimal climate policy with CCS and conclude that an early CCS use would substantially reduce the social cost of climate change.
The theoretical economic review on CCS is less abundant. Grimaud and Rougé [11] study the effects of the availability of CCS techniques on the optimal use of polluting exhaustible resources and on optimal climate policies within an endogenous growth model. By considering carbon storage rate instead of the storage flow, Ayong Le Kama et al. [3] develop a model to emphasise the main driving forces that should determine the optimal CCS policy. Lafforgue et al. [17] determine an optimal CCS policy in a model of energy substitutions in which carbon emissions can be stored into several reservoirs of finite size. Amigues et al. [2] assess the optimal timing of CCS policies by characterising the optimal path of energy price, energy consumption, carbon emissions and atmospheric abatement for several kinds of CCS cost functions.
However, none of these papers focused on social acceptance regarding carbon storage. In addition to its cost, the main obstacle for CCS is that it relies on carbon storage on a national site (particularly onshore), inducing the famous NIMBY (not in my back yard) problem. Examples of this problem include the failure of a carbon storage pilot on the Kona coast (Hawaii) because of environmental organisations (De Figuereido et al. [7] ) and fierce controversies in Germany and Poland concerning the CCS Directive (2009/31/CE Directive) implementation in national law. This social opposition seems paradoxical: public opinion surveys have shown a growing awareness of urgent actions to reduce GHG emissions, whereas a growing opposition to clean energies, such as nuclear power plants and RES, is observed. Likewise, CCS power plants face this type of opposition, which can mostly be explained by the following:
• Low levels of awareness or understanding of CCS (Ha-Duong et al. [13] ). The literature review indicates that respondents better understand CCS when climate issues are explained (i.e., the legitimacy of this technical option) and that an additional information can increase social acceptance (Tokushige et al. [24] ).
• The existence of storage risks (e.g. leaks) for which safety has not yet been proven due to the lack of large-scale pilots.
Although no articles have focused on CCS and social acceptance, variants of this problem have been studied by Ayong Le Kama and Fodha [3] , Moslerner and Requate [20] and Crettez and Jouvet [6] . Ayong Le Kama and Fodha [3] investigate the optimal nuclear waste storage policy under uncertainty using only one stock variable. Moslerner and Requate [20] use two stock variables and study the problem of the optimal emissions of pollutants when there may exist complementary or substitutability in emission cost. In their model, the disutility of the various pollution stocks enter in a separable way in the objective function. The paper of Crettez and Jouvet [6] differs from this approach by noting that if there is only one source of pollutant emissions, stocks of pollutants can still be complementary or substitutable.
In this paper, we adopt a static approach to determine, from the social point of view, simultaneously the amount of production as well as the optimal allocation of pollution (for instance, CO 2 ) between the atmosphere and underground storage sites. We determine the tax levels associated with the optimal allocation and we compare two cases: (1) when CCS techniques are unused/used as a climate mitigation option and (2) when CCS techniques are not/are considered as a local pollution. This second case introduces the idea of minimising the cost of the ecological transition tied with the large literature on burden sharing for GHG mitigation. Indeed, it may be less costly and thus more effective to deploy CCS in a low-cost country such as China or India (lower capital and labour costs) rather than in OECD countries. Vennemo et al. [25] study the macroeconomic impact of CCS in China, comparing two finance scenarios: an internal scenario where CCS is financed by China itself through a carbon tax and an external scenario where CCS is financed by international investors. Concerning the latter scenario, Vennemo et al. [25] state that "In the NGO community, and in China, there is an expectation that the international community will finance a significant share of CCS". External finance may come from Kyoto Protocol carbon credits, namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), because in 2011, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed and adopted Modalities and Procedures for CCS as a CDM. The comparison of the cases in which countries have their own climate policy or a common climate policy allows us to assess the transfers (monetary, technological) that OECD countries should deploy to encourage developed countries to deploy CCS. Eventually, to assess the sensitivity of tax and social welfare levels to social acceptance parameters, we specify the model and perform some numerical simulations. We show that the social welfare is most often higher when CCS techniques are used.
Note that the framework of this paper could be extended to nuclear waste, and even to social waste management issues. Indeed, nuclear waste could be seen as a good analogue to CCS, since both technologies require longterm monitoring, future generation inheriting from waste (CO 2 /radioactive) for thousands of years. As a consequence, both raise social acceptances issues and NIMBY syndromes. But if opinions on nuclear have been studied for a long time, opinions on CCS and CO 2 storage have only been studied for a few years and people are largely ignorant (Ha-Duong et al. [13] ). However, there are some reasons to believe that CO 2 storage is fundamentally less controversial. First, only one onshore repository is required for radioactive waste versus multiple CO 2 storage sites that might be onshore or offshore. Therefore, the need for many CO 2 storage sites would allow the avoidance of painful debates over equity associated with choosing a single national storage site. Second, radioactive waste is often associated with nuclear power and the potential for explosion or meltdown and security concerns (e.g., proliferation). If such fears exist about CCS (particularly carbon leakage), CO 2 is something more familiar and most people associate CO 2 with breathing and photosynthesis. As for CCS, a few papers deal with this kind of trade-off, for instance, Le Kama and Fodha [3] . A parallel could also be drawn with social waste management, particularly the trade-off between incinerating and burying waste. The incineration of waste could be assimilated with a power plant without CCS (emission of pollutants) and landfilling with CO 2 underground storage. Here again, few articles deal with this issue. See, for instance, Dijkgraaf and Volleberg [8] .
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its main assumptions. Section 3 studies the social optimum and then derives the decentralised equilibrium outcome to characterise the tax levels implementing the social optimum for the two cases detailed above. Section 4 specifies the model and provides some numerical simulations in order to compare production, tax and social welfare levels between the cases without and with CCS techniques and when CCS is seen as a local pollution. The last section concludes.
The Model
We consider the producers of an output (for instance, energy). To produce this output, producers use a wellbehaved production function (increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one) F : R + → R + with a unique input E (for instance, oil, gas or coal). This function satisfies the Inada conditions: lim E→0 F E (E) = +∞, lim E→∞ F E (E) = 0 and F (0) = 0. The unit cost of the input is denoted by q (in terms of the produced good).
A representative firm maximises its profit, π :
With perfect competition, the factor price q is given and is equal to the marginal productivity:
We assume that pollutant emissions are a joint product of the input used in the production, E. In a static framework, we consider that only a fraction of E may contribute to the atmospheric concentration of pollutants, A(E). With the function A(.) we accept that the effect of E on the atmospheric pollution is not necessarily one to one. We assume that A E (E) ≥ 0 and A EE (E) ≥ 0. 1 Each agent derives its utility from the consumption of goods, C = F (E) − qE and is negatively affected by the pollution, A(E). Household preferences are represented by a utility function U(C,A(E)):
where θ 1 > 0 is a preference parameter, representing the marginal disutility caused by the atmospheric emissions of pollutants.
Introducing CCS techniques implies that the effect of E on the atmospheric pollution can be reduced. Denoted by Z, the quantity of pollutant emissions is captured and then stored underground between 700 and 5000 m (depleted oil and gas fields or deep saline aquifers).
The storage creates an additional pollution which is located underground, S(Z) with S Z (Z) ≥ 0. 2 The effect of the storage on the atmospheric pollution implies A(E, Z) with A Z (E, Z) < 0. This storage affects agent's preferences in two ways. Firstly, the underground storage induces a new direct disutility, θ 2 S(Z) where θ 2 > 0 is a preference parameter. It represents the marginal disutility caused by the storage. Secondly, pollutants are now both in the atmosphere and underground. This double concentration of pollutants induces a new effect: G(A(E, Z), S(Z)). With G(.), unlike most academic papers that have a dichotomous approach and consider either the atmospheric or the underground pollution, we consider the problem as a whole: CCS introduces a third source of disutility due to the simultaneous presence of CO 2 in the atmosphere and in geological formations. It means that each pollution affects the marginal disutility of the other. The effect can be one of two kinds. On the one hand, an increase in atmospheric/underground pollution may increase the marginal disutility of the other (the pollutants would be complementary); on the other hand, the effect could be negative. That is to say, an increase in the atmospheric/underground pollution could lead to a decrease in the marginal disutility of the second one.
Furthermore, we also assume that the use of CCS techniques is costly, (Z). This cost is measured in terms of production through a symmetrical function: : R → R + , which is increasing, convex and smooth ( (0) = Z (0) = 0). The profit function then becomes the following:
In this case, household preferences are represented by
Results: Social Optimum Without and With CCS
In this section, we consider that a social benevolent planner corrects environmental externalities without and with CCS techniques. Then we decentralise the studied economy and determine the optimal carbon tax level(s) required to implement the social optimum.
Social Optimum Without CCS and Decentralisation, with a Tax on Input
In this case, only the atmospheric concentration of pollutants is considered to compute the social optimum. The central planner objective function is
The first-order condition (FOC) is
The FOC is a standard condition for the optimal solution. It states that the marginal utility loss caused by an additional pollution should be equal to the marginal utility gain due to an additional consumption. If environmental externalities are internalised due to a tax τ applied to the input used in the production, E, from Eq. 1, a representative firm will maximise its profit:
We obtain the following condition:
Comparing Eqs. 7 and 9, the optimal tax is defined by
The optimal taxation is equal to the effect of the pollution accumulation on the agents' utility.
It is clear that τ increases with E.
Social Optimum with CCS and Decentralisation
In this case, the social planner corrects environmental externalities by considering damage to the environment and by using CCS techniques. It might be considered a second best social optimum because of the introduction of a second source of externality. The objective function is
The corresponding optimality conditions are
and
The corner solution, Z = 0 is defined by
In the corner case, the first optimality condition can be interpreted as above. The second condition shows that decreasing the first pollution at the margin yields a benefit which is more than cancelled out by the increase in the damage due to the second pollution. Considering the interior solution Z > 0, we have
In this case, if environmental externalities are internalised due to a tax, ρ, applied the input used in the production, E; CCS techniques; and a new tax, γ , applied to the underground storage, from Eq. (1), a representative firm will maximise its profit:
We obtain the following conditions:
Comparing Eqs. 12, 17 and 19, 20, the optimal policy is defined by
In order to compare production, tax and welfare levels between the case with and without CCS techniques, we need to specify the technology used and the external effect of pollution.
Global and/or Local Pollution
Considering CCS as a local pollution effect and assuming two different regions, region A without CCS and region S with CCS, we can draw the welfare effect related to the introduction of CCS in only one region. Technologies are assumed identical between the two regions. Thus, from aforementioned equations, region A and S welfares are respectively given by
Optimal conditions are given by
Optimal tax/subsidy levels for each region are equivalent to the previous results.
If we compute the total welfare, the program to be solved is:
The following are the optimal conditions:
The comparison of the FOCs (25), (26) and (27) with (29), (30) and (31) shows when the two countries/regions are aggregated, the marginal disutility due to pollution felt in one of the two countries directly affects the other. In order to compare the social welfares from the two regions as well as the total welfare effect, we need to specify the technology used and the external effect of pollution.
Numerical Simulations and Discussion
Some numerical simulations are presented for illustrational purposes. Note the term illustrational: we do not intend to quantify tax and social welfare levels but rather to illustrate their sensitivity/evolution to parameter changes, i.e., to social acceptance regarding atmospheric pollution, underground pollution or both.
Model Specification and Assumptions
To specify the model and acquire simple analytical developments, we assume that the production function is a CobbDouglas with a unique input E and constant yield β with 0 < β < 1. Classically, we have F (E) = E β .
Hereafter, the business-as-usual (BAU) case refers to the case where CCS techniques are not used and a tax, only applied to the polluting input, internalises environmental externalities (see Section 3.1). The CCS case refers to the case where CCS, a tax applied to the polluting input as well as a tax applied to the amount of CO 2 which is stored underground, are used to internalise environmental externalities (see Section 3.2).
When CCS is not used (BAU case), we assume that the atmospheric pollution is
where α is the carbon content of the production and αF (E), the pollutant emissions. The condition A EE (E) ≥ 0 implies that β ≥ 1 2 . When CCS techniques are used, we assume that the atmospheric and underground stocks of pollutant are respectively: 2 , where αF (E) − Z represents net atmospheric emissions of pollutants
The effect induced by the double pollution is assumed to be G (A(E, Z) , S(Z)) = (αF (E) − Z)Z, where intercepts both underground and atmospheric effects of the pollutant emissions on the objective.
The cost related to the use of CCS techniques is assumed to be (Z) = 1 2 φZ 2 . By referring to the aforementioned specifications and Eq. 10 for the BAU case and Eqs. 21, 22 for the CCS case, the optimal taxation levels are • In the BAU case,
• In the CCS case,
Result 1 τ and ρ are taxes on the carbon content of the input and are decreasing functions of the production level (for ρ, it implies θ 1 ≥ ). When CCS techniques are used, a second economic tool is required: γ . As Z ≥ 0, γ is a subsidy dedicated to CO 2 storage. −γ is a increasing function of Z.
This idea of a subsidy dedicated to carbon storage can be found in Grimaud and Rougé [11] . Indeed, they explain that many reasons exist which prevent policy-makers from implementing the Pigouvian level of the carbon tax, for instance, the lack of an international consensus. Amongst the second-best economic policies they study, there is a subsidy to carbon storage.
This result has significant policy and normative implications. Indeed, if it is optimal to subsidise carbon storage, it increases the absolute profitability of CCS plants with respect to non-CCS plants. Consequently, the additional financial supports (FIT, CCS purchase contracts, etc.) required to trigger CCS deployment would be lower, therefore reducing the risk of inefficient policies and windfall effects.
To perform numerical simulations, several technoeconomic assumptions are made (Table 1 ).
Optimal Taxation and Social Welfare, with and Without CCS: Numerical Simulation Results
We study, ceteris paribus, the effects of a marginal variation of θ 1 , θ 2 and on the input consumption, tax levels and social welfares ( Table 2) .
Numerical simulations are presented from Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
As Fig. 1 shows, the higher the value of θ 1 , the lower the input consumption and the higher the tax level on the polluting input, Z and γ . Figure 2 shows that the social welfare levels, with and without CCS techniques, decrease with θ 1 . Indeed, to reduce the atmospheric pollution, the production level decreases. Coefficient of the production β 0.
-function
Note that the subsidy is expressed in e/tCO 2 , whereas taxes applied to the polluting input are expressed in e/t. In order to compare their level, we convert τ and ρ into e/tCO 2 . The multiplying factor is from ADEME a α corresponds to the emission factor of a supercritical coal plant using hard coal. Note that simulation results are similar for a CCS gas plant b Coal price is from the IEA New Policy Scenario (2012) for 2015 c CCS cost comes from Renner (2013) (it is similar to a CO 2 avoided cost calculated from the IEA study, with its 2030 cost projections) The CCS social welfare is higher and less sensitive to θ 1 variations than the BAU welfare.
As Fig. 3 indicates, in the BAU case, the polluting input consumption, the production and tax levels etc., are not affected by θ 2 variations.
The higher the value of θ 2 , the lower Z and γ become. As Z decreases, net atmospheric emissions of pollutant, as well as ρ, increase until reaching the BAU level. Consequently, the CCS social welfare decreases with θ 2 until reaching the BAU level (Fig. 4) .
As previously said for θ 2 , in the BAU case, variations have no effect. Figures 5 and 6 show that the higher the value of , the lower the input consumption (and thus the production level) as well as the lower value of Z and γ . As a consequence, the CCS social welfare decreases with until reaching the BAU level (Fig. 6) .
To summarise, the main results issued from these numerical simulations are as follows:
• Result 1 To note, γ is a subsidy to the underground storage of CO 2 .
• Result 2 The input consumption, and thus the production level, is higher when CCS techniques are used. The intuition behind this is when CCS techniques are used, the CO 2 is captured before it enters the atmosphere and thus the disutility caused by atmospheric pollution is reduced. Consequently, the production level is higher when CCS techniques are used.
• Result 3 The tax level on the polluting input is higher in the BAU than in the CCS case.
• Result 4 The social welfare is usually higher when CCS techniques are used. More precisely, with E CCS E * , the CCS social welfare is higher than the BAU welfare if θ 1 . The reasoning behind is the following: CCS techniques are a new tool to reduce atmospheric concentration of pollutants and introduce a preference for diversity, in accordance with Grimaud and Rougé [11] . They demonstrate that the availability of CCS techniques increases the social welfare.
The CCS social welfare decreases with θ 2 and variations until reaching the BAU level. Indeed, when social acceptance with respect to carbon storage decreases, CCS techniques are less used. The only way to reduce the atmospheric pollution is then decreasing the production level.
Additional simulations have shown that when the marginal disutility due to atmospheric pollution is considerably lower than the marginal disutility caused by underground storage, itself lower than the marginal disutility caused by both stocks of pollutant, the CCS social welfare is lower than the BAU level. It means that when people have little concerns for the global warming issue, and are reluctant to consider carbon storage, the use of CCS techniques is not optimal.
• Result 5 The social welfare levels, with and without CCS techniques, decrease with θ 1 . The CCS social welfare is less sensitive to θ 1 variations than the BAU welfare. Indeed, in the CCS case, some of the CO 2 emissions can be stored to reduce the atmospheric pollution.
Global and/or Local Pollution: Numerical Simulation Results
Until now, we have studied the acceptance conditions under which the use of CCS techniques is socially optimal. Now, we consider that the atmosphere is a public good, i.e. the atmospheric emissions of pollutant from one country, but also those from other countries/regions have an impact on the quality of the air we breathe. We also consider that the use of CCS techniques generates a local pollution. It means that optimal climate policies need to consider both local and global emissions of pollutant.
Two cases are distinguished: (1) each country/region optimises its own climate policy by taking into account global and local pollution, and (2) a unique social planner aggregates the two regions/countries. In each case, one country/region uses CCS techniques (S) whereas the other does not (A).
We assume that the two countries/regions are technologically identical (β is the same in A and S) but can have different acceptance levels regarding the atmospheric concentration of pollutants (θ A 1 , θ S 1 ). We study the effects of a marginal variation of θ A 1 , θ S 1 , θ 2 and on the input consumption and thus the production, tax and social welfare levels. As previously, we adopt a ceteris paribus approach (Table 3) . For the first case, the optimal taxation levels are issued from the comparison of Eq. 25 for country/region A and Eqs. 26 and 27 for country S and by referring to Sections 3.3 and 4.1:
As Figs. 7 and 8 suggest, when θ A 1 increases, in country/region A, the production and the social welfare levels decrease. θ A 1 variations have no impact on the production level of the country S but decrease its social welfare (Z decreases with E A ). When θ A 1 is higher than θ S 1 , the social welfare in country S becomes higher than in A (Fig. 8) .
As Figs. 9 and 10 show, when θ S 1 increases in country S, Z as well as the production and the social welfare levels decrease. On the contrary, in country A, the production and the social welfare levels increase with θ S 1 . It can be explained this way: as S decreases its atmospheric pollution, A can partly increase its polluting input consumption (the other parameters of social acceptance are steady). Consequently, when θ S 1 becomes greater than θ A 1 , the social welfare becomes higher in A than in S except when θ 2 and are low (high disutility due to the atmospheric CO 2 concentration can be offset by CO 2 storage).
As Figs. 11 and 12 indicate, when θ 2 increases with θ A 1 ≥ θ S 1 (it has also been verified for θ A 1 = θ S 1 ), the production level in the two countries/regions as well as Z decrease. In the two countries/regions, the social welfare level decreases with θ 2 but is higher when CCS techniques are used.
When θ A 1 < θ S 1 and θ 2 increases (Figs. 20 and 21 in the Appendix), Z as well as the production and the social welfare levels decrease. There is a social level of disutility regarding CO 2 storage beyond which the social welfare in A becomes higher than in S (the pollution storage is less allowed and thus cannot offset a higher disutility to atmospheric pollution).
With Figs. 13 and 14, it can be seen that when increases and θ A 1 = θ S 1 < θ 2 , the production and the social welfare levels increase in A whereas they decrease in S in spite of an increase of Z. When the marginal disutility due to both underground and atmospheric emissions of pollutant is significant, the social welfare becomes higher in A than in S.
When θ A 1 = θ S 1 > θ 2 , A and S social welfares decrease with . When is higher than a particular threshold , the social welfare becomes higher in A than in S.
• Result 6: When CO 2 atmospheric concentration is seen as a global public bad (GHG responsible for climate change) and CCS as a local pollution (negative externality related to the storage site), changes in social preferences in one country affect the social welfare in another country.
• Result 7:
The social welfare is higher in country S than in A, except when θ A 1 < θ S 1 with θ 2 ≥ θ 2 and ≥ , θ 2 > 0, > 0. Figure 14 illustrates clearly the importance of this result. When is null, the welfare is higher with CCS than without. However, when epsilon increases, the welfare becomes higher without CCS than with CCS. Based on similar parameters of social acceptance regarding atmospheric and underground pollution, but without taking into account , public decision-makers could favour CCS deployment to increase the social welfare. However, if were not null, the social welfare would be reduced by CCS use. Thus, taking into account the double stock effect or the third source of marginal disutility induced by CCS is required for an optimal CCS deployment. Now, we shall consider the second case, i.e., the planner aggregates the two countries.
By referring to the model specification and Eqs. (29), (30) and (31), the tax levels on atmospheric and underground emissions of CO 2 are the following:
With our set of parameters and hypothesis, it implies that E A = E S and τ = ρ.
As (respectively θ S 1 , ) increases, the production level of the two countries/regions decreases as well as the global welfare even if Z increases.
When θ 2 increases, the production level and Z decrease. Consequently, the global welfare decreases.
• Result 8: The global social welfare decreases as soon as the marginal disutility to underground/ atmospheric/ both pollution increases. To note, when the two countries/regions are not aggregated, an increase of θ A 1 , θ S 1 , θ 2 or in one country/region can increase the social welfare of the other country/region.
• Result 9: The global social welfare corresponds to a Pareto optimum. Indeed, when the two countries/regions are not aggregated and that one of them is affected by a lower social acceptance regarding pollution (atmospheric, underground, both), its production level has to be decreased to reduce pollution, whilst the other country/region can partly increase its pollution and thus its social welfare level.
The comparison of the two cases, when countries are or are not aggregated, can allow us to assess the transfers between A and S that would encourage S to deploy CCS in order to improve the global air quality. In relation to what has been done above and for illustrational purposes, we can classify different types of country in order to assess more precisely the social welfare level sensitivity to the parameters featuring the disutility caused by the pollution stocks. Four main cases are represented: (1) Tables 4 and 5 give, for each country, the values for social acceptance parameters and the social welfare levels obtained for each configuration.
For these values of social acceptance parameters, if each country only considers its pollution, the social welfare is higher with than without CCS techniques.
What happens when global as well as local pollution are considered?
For Germany, without CCS techniques, the German social welfare is lower than the other countries using CCS. If CCS techniques are used, the German social welfare is slightly higher than the other countries except Poland. Thus, on average, Germany would be interested in using CCS techniques. However, the global social welfare level (with and without CCS) is higher when Germany does not use CCS whilst the other countries do. Indeed, Germany has a disutility to atmospheric pollution lower than or equal to the other countries and a social acceptance to CO 2 storage higher than or equal to the other countries (that can bury CO 2 to produce more). Thus, Germany would be interested in subsidising CCS deployment in other countries. It is the same for Poland; On average, its social welfare level is higher when CCS techniques are used in the other countries.
For Norway, whatever the configuration (either A or S), the Norwegian social welfare is lower than in other countries, except when Germany does not use CCS techniques (same disutility to atmospheric pollution but more CO 2 can be stored in Norway). However, the Norwegian social welfare level, as well as the global social welfare, is higher when Norway uses CCS techniques. Thus, Norway would be interested in acquiring support from countries such as Poland and Germany, to deploy CCS techniques.
For the USA, the American social welfare level is higher when the country uses CCS techniques.
The global social welfare is the highest when CCS is deployed in Norway. 
Conclusion
CCS is a promising option for climate change mitigation. The two main hurdles to a widespread CCS deployment are social acceptance and its very high cost. As very few economic models investigate CCS social acceptance, this paper aims at determining, from the social point of view, the amount of production as well as the optimal allocation of CO 2 emissions between the atmosphere and underground storage sites. From a methodological point of view, the novelty of this paper is the introduction of the marginal disutility due to both atmospheric and underground pollution, in addition to the two marginal disutilities due to atmospheric and underground pollution as has been modelled previously.
With this third source of marginal disutility, we can consider all aspects of the issue. Using numerical simulations, we show that CCS usually provides a higher social welfare if public policies tax fossil fuels and subsidise CO 2 storage.
To assess the sensitivity of tax and welfare levels to social acceptance parameters, the model is specified and numerical simulations are performed. Two cases are distinguished: (1) one country isolated and (2) two countries, one with CCS the other one without, in which CCS is considered a local pollution and air quality a public good.
Interestingly, given the model specifications, the use of CCS techniques implies the introduction of a new fiscal tool, γ , which is a subsidy to CO 2 storage.
In addition, we show that social welfare is most often higher when CCS techniques are used, except for the following conditions:
• For (1), the marginal disutility due to atmospheric pollution is lower than the marginal disutility caused by underground storage, which is itself lower than the marginal disutility caused by both stocks of pollutant.
• For (2), θ 2 or/and is significant, and the marginal disutility to atmospheric pollution is higher in country A than in country S. If the marginal disutility to atmospheric pollution is high and the social acceptance to CO 2 storage is low, the only way to reduce pollution is to decrease the production level.
This result of CCS social welfare being higher than the BAU welfare can be explained as follows: when CCS techniques are used, the CO 2 is captured before it enters the atmosphere, and thus the disutility caused by atmospheric CO 2 concentration is reduced. As a consequence, the polluting input consumption and, consequently, the production level can be higher with CCS. In addition, the use of CCS techniques introduces a new tool to reduce atmospheric pollution. Therefore, the preference for diversity can also explain a higher welfare with the use of CCS techniques than without. Note that the tax level on the polluting input is lower when CCS techniques are used.
When the geographical dimension is taken into account, we show that there are configurations of social preferences for which one country can, by using CCS techniques, simultaneously increase its social welfare and that of its neighbour that does not use CCS. The comparison of the two cases, when countries have their own climate policy or are aggregated, allows us to assess the transfers required to encourage CCS deployment in the CCS country.
The specific configurations of social preferences where CCS is not socially optimal allows us to explain the failure of some CCS projects.
Thus, CCS techniques are a promising option for climate change mitigation, and accurately assessing social preferences can help us determine their optimal level of deployment.
All of these results are obtained in static models. One direct and natural extension of this paper might be the study of dynamic scenarios in order to give more recommendations for the optimal deployment of CCS and associated tax policies. 
